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Prologue
Postcolonial nation-states carry not merely the marks of their erstwhile political and
cultural experiences of colonisation but also the ‘burdens’ of nationalism. These include
a certain anxiety about their territorial and political status that refuses to engage with
interrogations of the nation-state and insists upon confining thinking within a set of
givens: defined boundaries, which make up what a civil rights activist called ‘cartographic
nationalism,’1 sovereignty of the nation-state form which is beyond question, and a
cultural unity defining the ‘essence’ of a people, and thus legitimising the making of
the nation-state as a territorial formation. For the postcolonial nation-states of South
Asia, the anxieties are so numerous that critiques of the nation-state have taken more
time than warranted to make their way into civil rights activism (where they are fairly
consolidated now) and much longer into scholarship, a process that is finally underway.
Feminist scholarship on the nation-state too has had a late start in our region but
Indian feminism stands out even within South Asia for its failure to grapple with
fundamental issues around the nation-state from a decidedly feminist perspective.
This has meant that theorising militarisation and internal repression, even conflict
between ‘communities’ and regions, has taken far longer to emerge in India than it has
in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. An important question for me in recent times
has been to try and understand why this has been so: over the years, I have come to
have misgivings about the peculiar burdens of postcolonial nationalism specific to India
where the Indian middle class believes, and has been led to believe from the inception
of the nation-state, that ‘our’ nationalism carries the imprimatur of a pure and liberatory
patriotism pitted against an evil, racist colonialism; further, that it was untainted by the
‘selfish’ and ‘communal’ demand for the partition of the sub-continent on religious
lines. The nation-state in India is thus constructed as an example of a ‘higher’ nationalism
based upon the principles of secularism and democracy, features absent in the
nationalism of Pakistan. Both men and women subscribe to these assumptions often
explicitly but, even more often, implicitly. Consequently, we have rarely listened to the
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postcolonial nation state of India from its very inception. In this paper, I examine some
issues that mark the relationship of Indian feminism to Indian nationalism in the
postcolonial phase and explore the ways in which  pioneering work on feminism and
nationalism in Asia suggests lines of enquiry that can help us understand not just our
own politics of location but the limits nationalism places in mobilising resistance against
the repressive practices of nation-states in South Asia.
Kumari Jayawardena’s pioneering book on feminism and nationalism in Asia
(Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World) is well-known and it opened up research
and writing on the area in Asia. As I see it, the most important contribution of this
book, as indeed of all Kumari’s work, is that she never loses track of class and the
manner in which she delineates the class basis of nationalism (and therefore of the
postcolonial nation-state) is one of relentless interrogation. By bringing into focus the
active relationship between capitalism and the bourgeoisie-led anti-colonial, nationalist,
and independence movements on the one hand, and between capitalism and the
women’s movement on the other, she suggests the parameters as well as the limits of
women’s consciousnesses and their emotional and material investments in both class
and nation as postcolonial creations in South Asia.2 In her account of the rise of the
bourgeoisie in Sri Lanka, Kumari’s chapter on gender offers a powerful analysis of the
centrality of the women’s question to both the making of the bourgeoisie and the
ideology of the nationalists—i.e. to the nationalist bourgeoisie, and thus to the making
of the bourgeois family with its attendant ideology of bourgeois morality that underpins
family and gender relations. In Sri Lanka, the project of bourgeois family morality and
the nationalist Buddhist woman was best articulated by Bhikkhu Angarika Dharmapala.3
Nira Yuval-Davis points to the links between the rise of the bourgeoisie, family morality
and nationalism in other regions of the world.4  It is this class that both defined
nationalism and the cultural basis of the nation; that the process by which certain
aspects of the culture were selected, privileged over others, and constructed as
‘authentic’, while others were  marginalised and/or excluded was conducted by this
class is by now well-known and well-documented in the scholarship on nationalism.
Feminists in South Asia have pushed the argument further, been acutely sensitive
to the processes of tradition-making and have contributed richly to our understanding
of the ‘invention’ of tradition and the centrality of women’s identity in constructing the
identity of the nation, across South Asia. What I want to suggest, however, is that even
as feminists have been very strong in critiquing the cultural basis of nationalism, they
have not been as mindful of the class (and caste) and regional bases of this nationalism
and the implicit assumptions that have shaped our own ideologies of nationalism,
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and the way we ourselves have been constructed to invest in our own nation-states in
this process.
Kumari’s engagements with feminism and nationalism have taken other directions too:
in The White Woman’s Other Burden, Kumari5 explores a terrain which has virtually
been a monopoly of feminists in western academia, perhaps because we were
preoccupied with our own colonial histories and the history of our foremothers. Always
‘dispassionately passionate,’ Kumari’s location in Sri Lanka, with its own complicated
legacy of multiple ethnicities, colonialism and cosmopolitanism, has enabled her to
recover a rich history of white, western women’s engagements with the projects of
feminism, nationalism and class in South Asia from the parameters of a newly-forged
feminist constituency and of a shared politics in the different regions of South Asia.
Thus, Kumari also made a sustained attempt not to confine feminism within a narrowly
defined nationalism but show how women have transcended and crossed over from
their birth-based identities—in the making of which they have had no choice—as white,
English, or mixed. These crossings, when antagonisms and conflicts were internal to
different segments of erstwhile colonised states, actually point to directions which can,
indeed must, be taken in the present so that our feminisms do not become part of the
hegemonic projects of the nationalisms of the nation-states within which we are
inscribed.
Part I: South Asian Feminist Interventions
I.1. Pakistan
In the year 2001, at a Women’s Studies conference in Lahore, a session on ‘Women in
Conflict’ was planned. It was after all the thirtieth anniversary of the Pakistan
government’s military action in erstwhile East Pakistan that had led to the liberation/
secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan. The military action had resulted in a bitter
legacy for those who lived through the bloody days that divided the women of undivided
Pakistan;6 a number of the women who found themselves facing this bitterness in East
Pakistan, and had even sworn never to go to Pakistan after what happened in 1971,
were present at this conference in Lahore: the session was being chaired by Hamida
Hossain, a native of Sind in Pakistan, married to a Bangladeshi and now a citizen of
Bangladesh, and the first paper on ‘Women in Conflict’ was to be read by Amena
Mohsin from Bangladesh whose father was in the Pakistan army in 1971, had been
posted in Lahore and was, therefore, interned, with his family, in the Lahore cantonment
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a house arrestee, as it were. She was now active in Conflict and Peace Studies and had
been involved in the negotiations between the Bangladesh government and the leaders
of the Chittagong Hill Tracts movement for a resolution to the conflict.
As the session began, all the participants of this South Asian conference stood for
a few minutes in memory of those who were killed, raped and suffered the ravages of
the war of 1971. We stood not in silence but to the strains of Nayyara Noor’s poignant
rendering of Faiz’s ‘Hum to thehre ajnabi kitni madaraaton ke baad, phir banenge
ashne kitni mulakaton ke baad, kab nazar mein ayegi bedaag sabze ki bahar, khoon ke
dhabbe dhulenge kitni barsaaton ke baad’ (hospitalities exchanged, yet we remain
strangers, after how many meetings will we become intimate? When will we sight the
spotless green? After how many rains shall the bloodstains fade?) written on his visit to
Dhaka in 1974. Every one of us, from Pakistan, from Bangladesh and from India,
carried our own particular burden of memories and we followed up the standing in
memory with a strongly-worded resolution demanding that the Pakistan government
apologise to the women of Bangladesh for the sufferings they caused to them in 1971.
We realised that we shared a wound that healed to an extent through this act despite
our recent histories. A shared bond was articulated in that experience, both in the
conference and outside it, as we recalled the isolations of that moment and others—
when women stood and acted against the grain. I will never forget Tahira Mazhar Ali’s
account of 1971 when only a handful of women and men came out to the streets of
Lahore to protest the military action on East Bengal and the hatred to which they were
subjected by the hyper-nationalist crowd on the pavements branding them as anti-
national betrayers of the ‘nation.’ I remember not only recalling many moments of such
isolation in the last few years, but also thinking to myself: could we in India have done
what we did in Lahore that day? Could we cross boundaries and identities to publicly
acknowledge wrong caused by our government in the name of national security and
territorial integrity and demand an apology from it?7 Further, do we know how to
distinguish between political action and rhetorical self-flagellation, the latter of which
does not take us anywhere? What is the nature of the relationship between us as
women in the women’s movement and our nationalisms, our conceptualisations of the
nation-state and our feminist perspectives?
Feminist engagements with the nation-state, rather than merely the state, have
been a product of crises, of conflicts. These crises are the result of the distinctive,
uneven histories of nation-states in south Asia and feminist engagements with nation-
states across the region have also been uneven: in Pakistan and Sri Lanka, for example,
interrogations of state power from a feminist perspective came much earlier than in
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between militarisation, patriarchy, and fundamentalism placed women dramatically in
the eye of the storm in Pakistan before the rest of South Asia. The critical position of
women caught in the midst of armed conflict was central to Sri Lankan feminist
engagements with the state since the middle of the 1980’s. Similarly, the state and its
links with fundamentalism were written about in Pakistan and Bangladesh before such
conceptualisations made their appearance in India. A summary of these engagements
in feminist scholarship would be useful to issues I would like to explore in the second
part of this essay.
I have argued elsewhere that the nation-states carved out of the Indian subcontinent
in 1947 witnessed a crisis of legitimacy roughly around the same time—about a
generation after the states had become independent of colonial rule.8 What is evident
is that South Asian states had failed the aspirations of ‘the people’ as the crises mounted
and manifested themselves on all fronts: economic, political, social and regional.
Governments, comprising the political elites, responded by an increasing use of
authoritarian force, from clamping civil emergencies as in India, to military coups as in
Pakistan, to language and region-based movements in what ultimately became
Bangladesh, and in Sri Lanka. In India, too, the regional autonomy movements were
continuous whether or not they were acknowledged by the state and the ruling political
elites. South Asia exploded in violence in 1971 with the war of liberation/secession
drawing Pakistan, India and the Bengali Pakistanis into a war that ended with the
independence of Bangladesh and the formation of a new nation-state. For the democratic
movements in all these states, but especially in Pakistan and Bangladesh, nationalism
and patriotism had perforce to be redefined. The suppressed question that Indian
elites never openly engaged with is that the territorial arrangements of 1947 could be
re-negotiated if the people’s cultural and economic aspirations were not fulfilled. India
was satisfied with taking the position that the break-up of Pakistan into two independent
states - in which she had played a part - was an inevitable consequence of the falsity
of the two-nation theory based on a religious identity alone. This validated the purity of
her nationalism and the falsity of other nationalisms in the sub-continent. That the
events of 1971 were an index of the relationship of a state with its ‘own’ people,
indicative of the crisis of the state itself, is not a lesson any of the states learnt in 1971.
But 1971 aggravated the internal crisis in Pakistan, and, by 1975, the country had
already seen thirteen years of military dictatorship. So when General Zia-ul-Haq assumed
power in 1977, it was not a new phenomenon for Pakistan.9 What was new, however,
were the strategies that Zia used to legitimise his power—an open recourse to
fundamentalism, pegged entirely on women. In the first speech he gave after the
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around which women must define their lives10. As one scholar has put it, the media was
used to exhort an Islamic way of life:
Significantly the yardstick by which the presence and/or absence of
Islam was measured was by the position of women: their dress code,
their behaviour, their role and function in society.11
Further, it was argued that technically, and in so far as the bid for power is concerned,
sexual control can extend beyond visible and known areas of morality. In reality, then,
the government’s puritanical and single-minded concern with the purification of society
through Islamisation operated at two levels:
1.  It served to deflect attention from the troubled issue of legitimacy faced by
the martial law regime by focussing on the discourses of religion and cultural
revivalism.
2. The forms of sexual control, ranging from government directives to female
government employees to dress modestly and wear the chadar to the
promulgation of the Hudood Ordinances in 1979 which enjoins Islamic
punishments for rape, adultery etc have made possible a whole series of state
interventions by the state in multiple areas of public and private life12
The effect of these changes has been the systematic devaluation of women within the
social order and the advantages of such a shift to the martial law regime have been
significant:
By linking sex and sin and focussing on the woman as the source of
temptation, the group in power has shifted attention from ‘real’ issues
like poverty, unemployment, nepotism and corruption in high places
and the question of their own legitimacy, onto the body of the woman,
which is depicted explicitly as the terrain across which male power
games are played.13
While the slogans of chadar and char divari were the means by which the military
rulers simultaneously legitimised themselves through the “piratisation of religious
terminology and consolidated themselves in the domain of public discourse,” it did not
take long for women in Pakistan to realise that the same slogans as well as the
“valorisation of the myth of the silent, invisible and enslaved woman” and the denigration
of the vocal or the working woman, would push women back and deny them their
uncertain but hard-fought gains of the past few years.14 They were among the first to
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not surprising that there was brutality and violence in the police action against the
women demonstrating against the Hudood Ordinances in front of the Lahore High
Court in February 1983.15 The women’s movement in Pakistan was born as a resistance
to the law, so there can be no dilemmas on feminist engagements with the law in
Pakistan as long as the Hudood Ordinances and other such patriarchal and fundamentalist
laws continue to be in operation. It is imperative to note, then, that the Pakistani
women’s movement has been decidedly anti-state, anti- fundamentalism and against
the militarisation of the state and civil society from its very birth in the 1980s.
The specific histories of the militarisation and Islamisation of society as ways for
the nation-state to survive in Pakistan16 and the manner in which such processes have
shaped the question of women’s autonomy and their everyday lives have been confronted
in action, and theorised in feminist scholarship, within a critique of political economy;
this body of work has been an important contribution to South Asian scholarship. Given
the nature of the challenges thrown up from the ground, it is not surprising that almost
every feminist scholar, whether or not a specialist in the subject, has written about the
relationship between the state and fundamentalism, the state and Islamisation, and
militarisation and patriarchy. The resistances by women to these developments have
also been the subject of feminist accounts, even though such writing has also had to
face a backlash.17
Much of the richness and creativity of these resistances still remains only in the
oral narratives of feminists and needs to be documented before it is lost forever: I will
recount only two aspects of the resistance by women which I have not seen mentioned
in written accounts: the first was the women artists’ resolution circulated in the artistic
community during Zia’s regime, but not published till much later, where they resolved
not to accept the state’s injunctions to abandon figurative art and  refuted the imposition
of chadar and char divari upon women;18 the second was Iqbal Bano’s refusal to accept
the dress code prescribed for women in public: she not only wore a sari at her
performances - which was regarded with disfavour by the military regime - but also did
not cover her head. Every one of a certain generation in Pakistan remembers her
singing of Faiz’s  ’Hum dekhenge’, to a packed audience in the early 1980s which was
received with wild jubilation as she used Faiz’s words and her rebellious persona to
challenge the authoritarian militarised state power of Zia as an earlier regime had
jailed Faiz in the 50s in the infamous Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case. 19
Challenging state power directly in Sind was also a critical aspect of the Sindhiani
Tehreek, a mass-based women’s movement which allied itself with Sindhi nationalism,
and took to the streets along with other groups in the movement for the restoration of
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Sindhiani Tehreek shared with the democratic movements in Sind was accompanied by
a movement against the feudal, patriarchal power within Sind and this movement with
its strong links with rural women and creative strategies in coming to the support of
women in distress needs to be visibilised in feminist scholarship more widely in South
Asia.20 It is an important legacy to hold on to at a point of time in our history as
feminists moving, as we seem to be, into a culture of NGOised 9 to 5 activism.
Feminist scholarship in Pakistan has scrupulously examined nation-state rhetoric
and policy: Saba Gul Khattak has subjected state policy to scrutiny in a sustained body
of work, some of which I shall examine here to provide a sample of the kind of issues
that have been taken up for consideration: Saba links foreign and domestic policy
discourses to argue that during the Zia years in Pakistan, policy-makers used Islam
and masculinity to fight off a constructed threat from India and communists at a time
when Pakistan was supporting the Mujahideen in Afghanistan in collaboration with the
US. The extent to which civil society was mobilised to support Afghanistan and the
emergence of what came to be popularly called the ‘Kalashnikov culture’ took its toll
even on discussions amongst civilian groups; intolerance coupled with a gun culture
reigned supreme in Pakistan under the name of safeguarding Islam.21 Such developments
went alongside prescribed discourses for the domestic realm: use of hyper-masculinist
symbols for the ideal Muslim man; the creation of a hierarchical relationship between
the protector and the protected, and the defence of the nation within this paradigm.
The struggle of East Pakistan for independence was presented as a demand from an
unreasonable, non-martial, effeminate people who deserved to be ruled by the martial
races of West Pakistan; the demand by the western powers to inspect the nuclear
facility was not only tantamount to the loss of national sovereignty but an invasion of
the sacred, domestic space with its constitutive notions of honour and shame:
We can bear anything, even the demolition of the fencing round our
houses, but we cannot bear the opening of our nuclear facilities. To us
the nuclear programme is similar to the honour of our mothers and
sisters, and we are committed to defend it at all cost.22
Towards the end of Zia’s regime, he convened a conference of 150 prominent persons
which concluded that the greatest problem facing the country was national survival.
Such anxieties about the nation-state were not confined narrowly to a military regime
but had a much wider reference as Saba shows in another essay where both the army
generals and the civilian Bhutto heading the state shared a masculinist rhetoric: the
sanctity of shared blood sacrifice for the nation, martyrdom and undying loyalty.23 As
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fundamentalism and patriarchy to negotiate the internal crisis of the nation-state.
Islamisation, Toor argues, was used to secure consent and to counter the bankruptcy
of bourgeois institutions in the country which irreparably damaged the unwritten social
contract between the postcolonial state and its citizens, particularly minorities [and
women].24
Though explored very summarily here, the complex feminist analysis of the crisis
of the postcolonial nation-state in Pakistan and its increasing recourse to a military-run
Islam with a range of ideological positions/manoeuvres is perhaps unique in south
Asia, as I have not come across such analyses for the other nation-states in the region.25
Even so, feminist scholarship has not to my knowledge explicitly addressed regional/
nationality movements in a substantial manner. The contestations of the nation-state
around linguistic and ethnic contradictions have been more central in framing issues
for feminist scholarship in Sri Lanka so I will now turn my attention to Sri Lankan
feminist writings on nationalism, the nation-state, and to the two decade-old militarised
conflict there.
I.2 Sri Lanka
Amongst the South Asian states, Sri Lanka has had the most acute threat to the ideology
and the real existence of the nation-state since the formation of postcolonial states in
our region. The specific history of Sri Lanka is that it is a small state caught up in a
complicated relationship to a much larger India, the country of origin of its sizeable
‘minority’ of Tamil speakers, both concentrated in certain regions such as the North
East and East Central parts of the island and dispersed over other areas as plantation
labour. Since the sixties, but more acutely from the early eighties of the twentieth
century, it has witnessed a regional/linguistic/ethnic movement leading to a militarised
conflict between Tamil speakers and the majority community of Sinhalas which has no
parallel in South Asia. Dealing with the range of violences that increasingly marked this
conflict became an imperative for feminist scholarship in Sri Lanka. A striking feature of
this feminist engagement with the nation-state and the conflict endemic to it is that
not just feminist scholars and women in the women’s rights movements have written
about nationalism, militarisation and gender but, together, these two segments - when
distinguishable as separate segments - have carried the arguments into the popular
media by writing a collective column in a newspaper under the pseudonym ‘Cat’s Eye,’
universally acknowledged by friends as an initiative of Kumari Jayawardena, who kept
it going for many years. Over a number of years, ‘Cat’s Eye’ carried feminist critiques of
nationalism, war, army brutalities, including rapes and killing of women, as part of the
10
conflict, sport as a substitute for war, cricket and nationalism, masculinity and war, and
the death penalty among other issues conventionally regarded as ‘feminist’. A notable
feature of this writing was its South Asian perspective with frequent references to
Pakistan and India, making it a great example of a South Asian feminist opinion. I will
use the articles collected in Cat’s Eye: A Feminist Gaze on Current Issues along with
other essays by Sri Lankan feminists to pick up certain themes useful for the purpose
of this essay.
Almost all the feminist writing explicitly examining nationalism and the making of
the nation as a gendered project from the early nineties critically engages with issues
of history, culture or identity.26 The themes of nationalism, war, motherhood, women’s
participation in the war as cadres of the LTTE or the Sinhala state, dislocation, internal
displacement, the militarisation of civil society, the lives of women as refugees or as
mothers and wives of the ‘disappeared’ have all been subjects of Sri Lankan feminist
scholarship. There is no way that I can do justice to the range of this writing in this
essay, so I will pick a few issues for a more detailed analysis as a sample of the work
that I am drawing upon to think about the ‘burdens of nationalism’ for feminists.
Using the figure of the mother to legitimise war is a trope long used in patriarchy.
As Serena Tennekoon observes: “Male military heroes and their “supporting” cast of
mothers and admiring wives and lovers are invoked to condone the insanity of organised
male violence.”27 Both Tamil and Sinhala nationalisms have at different points evoked
the mother figure to sanction the war in Sri Lanka. In an important analysis of
constructions of motherhood that feed into the ongoing ethnic conflict, Malathi de
Alwiss looks at the school curricula of the Sri Lankan state which includes a play on a
Sinhala king and the role his mother plays in preparing him for war against the Tamils;
the play was introduced into school text-books in 1952 and has stayed on in some form
in the material used by schools. In another story in the curriculum, Buddhism, Sinhalaness
and making sacrifices for the Sinhala nation are brought together to evoke the sentiment
that what is at stake in war, both then and now, are commitments to ‘country, race and
religion’28.  The queen mother is an example to all Sinhala mothers in the way she
turned her son into a true Sinhala nationalist and patriot. The construction of the moral
mother of history slides easily into the wife/mother of the soldier in the Sri Lankan
army in a poster, and the Sinhala mother’s sentiments expressed in poetry to her son
who is exhorted to die in battle only after first handing over the gun to another, even
as she proclaims that she will send her heroic second son too to battle.
Malathi de Alwiss connects the famous army poster put out by the state with the
queen mother of the school text-books and the mother in the Sinhala poem cited
above, published in a women’s magazine:
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[All three] share a common ideological terrain [as] all three women
can speak of sending sons to war—with authority and moral
righteousness – because it is they who  gave them life in the first place
[…] Such idealised images as warm tears, blood turned into milk […]
are harnessed in writings and other forms of public discourses such as
war songs and political speeches29.
These make up what de Alwiss terms the binary of moral mothers and stalwart sons to
serve the motherland. Other scholars have also explored motherhood, especially the
use of the grieving mother image to protest state repression in the context first of the
violence associated with the JVP movement in the form of disappearances or encounter
killings of sons and then the takeover of this position in various mothers fronts, first by
Tamil women and later even by Sinhala women whose soldier sons cannot be traced.
Sitaralega Maunaguru argues that the moral or brave mother who sends her son to
war can be countered or counter-positioned by the social mother, who speaks for
peace.30 Motherhood can thus be deployed in a variety of ways: to shame the
government, to interrogate the growing impunity of state actors who violate legal and
constitutional norms through a recourse to arbitrary arrests, torture, enforced
disappearances as well as to create a climate for peace. However, in using the space of
motherhood for protest, there is a playing out of the ‘essentialised and homogenised
cultural scripts of [their] society’ making for a complicated relationship with a strategy
that evokes ‘a natural order and family and society’ for feminists. Yet these contradictory
manoeuvres can also be depIoyed for other ends which demand a return to normalcy
and peace between warring factions of the state. Expanding on de Alwiss, Sitaralega
Maunaguru argues:
By accepting this responsibility to nurture and preserve life, which is
valorised by the Sri Lankan state, they [mothers] reveal the ultimate
‘transgression’ of the state as well: the state that has denied women
the opportunities for mothering through a refusal to acknowledge life
by resorting to violent repression. It was this contradiction that the
women of the north who organised themselves as the Mother’s Front,
and the Association of Mothers of Missing Youth, operated to use their
‘motherhood’ as a political force.31
Although there were problems in sustaining the idea of the mother as figure of peace
in the war-torn North, the construction of motherhood appealing for peace represents
an important moment of protest which contradicted the image of the mother calling for
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war.32At another level, feminists have also tried to counter  ‘Mother Politics’ with what
Neloufer De Mel calls ‘Woman Politics’ by focussing on the resistance of women and
the cross-border solidarity and support between resisting women, going beyond narrow
nationalisms. This is an important mode to interrogate both essentialised images of
the heroic mother of sons in the service of the motherland and its counter, the nurturant
mother calling for peace.33
An area of concern for feminist scholarship in Sri Lanka in the context of massive
levels of violence has been to look at other dimensions of the workings of nationalism
and the militarisation of society especially since the war began in the 1990’s. As the
LTTE consolidated itself to claim the status of the ‘sole spokesman’ of Tamil nationalism
by violently exterminating all internal opposition to their standpoint, women’s support
for the cause of Tamil nationalism has moved into a different phase with a significant
level of participation in direct combat. The phenomenon of the ‘new woman’ liberated
from traditional roles in a fairly conservative Tamil society has been written about both
by proponents of Tamil nationalism and by Sri Lankan feminists. Further, what are the
implications of women who stand up against a fascist, authoritarian closure of debate,
and a brutal stamping out of the dissenting voices of Tamil women who do not endorse
the LTTE position?34 What is the nature of the relationship of the female cadres in the
LTTE to the organisation; are they equal participants in any meaningful sense? Have
they successfully surmounted the patriarchies prevalent in Tamil society?35 One scholar
has termed their new status as one of ‘ambivalent empowerment’.36 Others have explored
the emergence of the ‘virgin warrior’ who dies with a cyanide capsule rather than a tali
(the symbol of a married woman) tied round her neck. Most powerfully, this new figure
was articulated through the image of the killer of Rajiv Gandhi. What is significant is
that while the LTTE claimed no responsibility for the killing, it suggested that it had
been done by an IPKF rape victim, a statement that was taken little notice of by the
media. Sitaralega Maunaguru, however, is struck by the metaphor of rape as the rationale
for the killing of an important political persona: the concept of revenge, whether the
symbolic rape of the motherland or an actual event has a powerful resonance:
The concept of revenge, the purification of oneself, and the courageous
nature of the Tamil woman are all fused into one: the highly symbolic
act of killing an important political figure […] the raped woman is
considered one who has lost her chastity: the super virtue of a Tamil
woman. She is not only violated but also polluted. She cannot regain
her purity by any means except by negating her polluted body […] the
woman killing her oppressor using her polluted body as a weapon
performs the above two functions […] she not only takes revenge
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against the enemy but also performs an ancient purificatory ritual—
the agnipravesam, or immolation by fire.37
In this powerful analysis of militant women and their mobilisation in the cause of Tamil
nationalism, Sitaralega uses history, tradition and myth to make very important
connections that help us to understand the power of nationalism and women’s agency,
a theme that feminists have had to theorise in Sri Lanka.
The wider conception of the relationship between feminism and nationalism as
contradictory or ambivalent has also surfaced, most visibly in the pieces authored by
the ‘Cat’s Eye’ collective. The interventions have been numerous and on such a large
range of issues that, in the book, they have been arranged according to themes; three
themes titled ‘The Body Politic’,  ‘Bureaucrats and Bigots’ and ‘Sports, Sex and Silly
Points’ provide a representative set of articles to look at. The pieces on cricket are not
only delightful, they constitute a sharp indictment of an obsessive emotional investment
in sports and its surrogacy for nationalism, jingoism and a war mentality. One of the
articles uses a Pakistani feminist psychotherapist, Dureh Ahmed’s, deconstruction of
the game to make the point that it is only south Asian feminists who have ‘cast a cold
eye [on the game] to raise a dissenting voice and to deplore the nationalist frenzy
attached to the sport”.38  As part of the perennial problem of which country’s team to
support, given the force of the ‘loyalty to nation’ test associated with it in popular
discourse, one piece in Cat’s Eye asks pertinently—why not support the country with
the best human rights and women’s rights record? In keeping with the concern for
human rights and women’s rights, there are pieces on the need to do away with the
death penalty, but the call for justice against the unstated assumption of impunity in
cases of rape, disappearances and torture, and the critique of jingoism and the
manufacture of history, also means that the Cat’s Eye feminists bore the backlash of
the jingoists.  A most important argument from the perspective of this essay is the
piece titled ‘Ultra Nationalists and Feminists’ a response to the comments made by the
Cat’s Eye collective on the appointment of the Sinhala Commission to examine the
question of the devolution of power. Cat’s Eye notes the critical comments in the press
to their piece:
We have been accused of being on the other side of the fence and of
being spokespersons of Tamil ultra nationalists and separatist forces.
All untrue. We are on the same side of the fence with those who
believe in peace, democracy, human rights, women’s rights, minority
rights and a pluralist society[…]
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Cat’s Eye problematises the use of sacred geography by the Sinhala Commission since
this is surrendering to the old forms of the state:
We oppose all politics of identity whose goal is to reinforce sameness
rather than celebrate diversity. This certainly applies to the ultra
nationalist politics of the LTTE as well as the politics of Sinhala
chauvinism […] it is essential to find ways of being in common rather
than falling into a politics of nostalgia.39
The column then goes on to cite the work of Romila Thapar in deconstructing the
politics of the invention of tradition and the need to separate myth from history in
order to scientifically understand history as social process.40
In sum, Sri Lankan feminists have provided powerful scholarly analyses of the
processes triggered off by a hyper-nationalist nation-state’s instrumental use of ethnicity
and language to consolidate majority support for itself, as well as engaged in an everyday
politics that gives an opportunity for the feminist gaze to try and shape discourses on
nationalism, state accountability, democratic rights of the people, and the violence of
the war in the public sphere.
I. 3 Bangladesh
The specific postcolonial history of the Bengali Muslims who ‘seceded’ from Pakistan
has shaped Bangladeshi feminist engagements with the nation-state, both at the moment
of its birth and during its later evolution, in terms of the relationship of the state to its
minorities and to its women, whether among the minorities or in the majority community.
Women, as a group, have been subjected to the insecurities of a search for a viable
nationalism and a national identity by a repeated targeting of their conduct as defying
normative standards set by those in control of power within the nation-state. The irony
of the ‘rape’ of Bangladesh by fellow Muslims within the ‘nation,’ by the army, was not
lost on the feminists. The state’s instrumental use of the rape of Bangladeshi women
for the whipping up of nationalist sentiment, mobilising support for the embryonic
nation-state both nationally and internationally, and their erasure after the mobilisation
had been achieved, has generated a strong feminist critique of the State. As the years
rolled on, the bironganas (heroic women) of 1971 found that not only did the state do
nothing for them, society stigmatised them. While they contributed to cementing the
nationalism of a fractured nation (which was not unanimously behind the political
resolution of the language question and the demand for a fair representation of the
Bengali people within Pakistan taking the form of a new state) and led to the forging of
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a ‘brotherhood of men’ to speak for the new nation, they themselves were soon forgotten
except as metaphors for war and suffering.41 One of the documentations prepared by
the Ain-O-Salish Kendro details 19 testimonies of women who were raped and the
indignity and stigmatisation they have continued to suffer since then, epitomised in the
words of one of the survivors: ‘Even today, my husband insults me by referring to those
past happenings and calls me a whore.’ As the Introduction to the volume by a number
of feminists in Bangladesh points out:
History may narrate, just in one sentence that such-and-such woman
was raped in the 1971 war, but the long years of suffering, insult and
injury that they have had to bear year after year is a painful history
which is never documented in any history book. [Given that the state
has used these women for their own propaganda purposes and then
forgotten them], these women fight a different battle all through their
lives […] for women this violent sexual treatment at the hands of the
state becomes doubly disorienting as it exacerbates and magnifies the
woman’s already subservient position in society and culture.42
The experience of the movement for liberation and the goals of secularism and
democracy which animated the discourses of the call for independence in Bangladesh
have left other legacies, especially for women. As the history of post-liberation
Bangladesh unfolds, the search for a national identity has also led to the adoption of
more Islamist measures coupled with a strategy of falling back on military coups to
gain state power. Women’s resistance to the growing threats of a ‘fatwa’ culture were
led by a doyen of 1971, mother of a martyred son, Jahanara Imam, who spearheaded
a people’s tribunal that demanded the trial of the Islamisist collaborators with Pakistan
in 1971 for their joint responsibility for the war crimes43.  The same forces were now
issuing ‘fatwas’ that legitimised the attacks on women perceived as ‘stepping out of
the bounds of social norms’. There were 1500 cases against mullahs who passed fatwas44
and a Supreme Court judgment held them illegal. The struggle of the women’s movement
against patriarchal forces using religion as a peg remains an ongoing concern for
women in the movement as well as a field for feminist writing.45
Feminist scholarship in Bangladesh has tried to look at the post-liberation
development of the nation state both in terms of its ideology and actions. Militarisation
and internal conflict have impacted women in specific ways and the women’s movement
in Bangladesh has also fought against internal repression. It has been argued by feminists
that although the formation of Bangladesh has not left it with any major border dispute,
there has been a strong military presence since its birth as a nation. Also, the imposition
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of military rule has been a significant factor in political rivalries and this has led to a
substantial militarisation of civil society with about half its total existence under some
or other military regime. Part of the rationale for militarisation is the way liberation has
been perceived in gendered terms, where men fought to create the nation and laid
down their lives in sacrifice, while the atrocities against women and the role played by
them are erased in the fourteen-volume official history on the making of the nation.
Once normalisation returned, the state concerned itself with the wranglings for power
and the rehabilitation of men.46 Later, the militarised regime turned its full power on
the Chittagong Hill Tracts when the region advanced its long-standing demand for
autonomy. Bangladesh came to be regarded as a classic example of a national security
state.
These factors have spawned a number of resistance groups in civil society, including
women’s groups like the Hill Women’s Federation, one of whose activists, Kalpana
Chakma, was abducted by the army and murdered. The abduction brought women’s
groups together across Bangladesh. Some of these processes have been analysed by
feminist scholars and I will end this section with the work of two of them, who I believe
brought their own specific personal histories to their scrutiny of the workings of the
nation state.
Meghna Guha Thakurta’s study of the struggle of the Chakmas based on interviews
is a poignant account of the experience of conflict and living under army rule: of the
permanent sense of fear, the disruption of everyday life as people were forced to
repeatedly take to hiding in the jungles, the witnessing scenes of or being subjected to
torture, the dailiness of sexual harassment by army personnel but also of the analytical
capacity of Kalpana Chakma who bought together the extraordinary conflict of the
moment with the longstanding inequalities of gender within the community of the
Chakmas. Meghna’s analysis recognises the complexity of the ‘Women and Conflict’
question as it is played out in Bangladesh. While outrages perpetrated by the army
have led to more protests by the women’s movement against state violence, there
have also been divisions within the women’s movement around the accord with the
state, with some women being deeply uncomfortable with what are perceived as
challenges to state sovereignty in the demand for autonomy; the movement as a
whole has, therefore, been reluctant to address issues of militarisation and nationalism
in a frontal manner.47
Some of the issues discussed above have, however, been frontally addressed in
the work of Amena Mohsin who has used her location as a teacher and scholar of
International Relations to subject theories of state security to a critical feminist gaze.
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Amena offers a sharp indictment of the way the early nation-state handled the birongana
issue, with the very ‘father of the nation’ Mujib-ur-Rahman condemning the women
and the children born to them as polluted.48 The proper role of women during conflict
outlined by male nationalists is that women should send their men into battle to defend
and protect the honour of their motherland for the protection of women and children.
They should do this strictly as supportive mothers, emotional and dependent wives
and lovers. Amena, who, as we noted, was interned in Lahore during the war in 1971
recalls the rhetoric of manliness evoked in the popular media:
I still remember a song played repeatedly on Pakistani Radio sung by
male singers in 1971, with the mocking words that war was not a
game for women. The reference was indeed to Mrs. Gandhi […]49
Amena’s essay then turns to examining the popular ‘feminist’ position of associating
women with peace as an essentialist formulation of women’s role as nurturers turning
them into ‘natural’ advocates for peace. Using her own information based on interviews,
she complicates this position to argue that it is women’s location on the margins of the
structures of power that gives them an edge in thinking about war. She cites numerous
examples of women who stayed on protecting their homes while their men fled, holding
on to these spaces through all sorts of adversities, even sleeping with the enemy when
necessary, for their children to come back to occupy their rightful place and thus turned
the notion of protector and protected on its head. Amena points out pithily:
I leave it up to you to draw the lines between the protector and the
protected in these instances […] wars are games of men, hence their
roles as sacrificers appear in the pages of history. Women appear as
footnotes and symbols. Such constructions […] not only fail to recognise
and acknowledge the active role played by women in security parlance
but also relegate them as inferiors in need of protection, thus
strengthening the gender bias in security discourse.50
Elsewhere, Amena has added that for the women with whom she had spoken, the
nation was only understood as the home, conventional borders and boundaries had
less relevance for them than the home, the community and the village they had remained
in even when everyone else had abandoned it.51
Amena has also argued that the question of women’s relationship to experiencing
violence, and then resisting its many facets is based on an understanding of violence
as a continuum that must be analysed at all levels. Women’s perspectives on security,
conflict and peace thus attempt to move out of the state-centricity of ‘realism’ and call
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for an analysis of violence at various levels—individual, national and international. She
critiques the case that some women have made for women to fight in the armed forces
as this would enable them to be actors and agents rather than victims. Instead of this
position, she argues that it is the meanings attributed to service to one’s nation and to
a notion of citizenship that glorifies dying for one’s country as the noblest form of duty
that need to be challenged. If women’s notions of peace and security are different,
they cannot be built upon the insecurity of others. Since violence is multidimensional,
Amena argues, security has to be multidimensional too.52
Part II: Feminism and Nationalism in Post-colonial India
Another Prolougue
Mahasweta Devi, the archetypal writer with a social conscience, wrote a powerful story
titled ‘Dopdi’ about two decades ago; the story centred around a tribal woman  suspected
to know about, or be part of, a militant, underground, left-wing resistance group and is
arrested and raped by the police. In the morning, she is to be presented before the
government official in charge of the operation, but when the policemen come to collect
her and take her before the ‘saheb,’ she refuses to put on her clothes. When she is
presented before the horrified officer in her naked state, she challenges him with the
statement—”Alright!  Go on, counter me!” and the story ends on that note as she
taunts him with her violated body. 53Dopdi’s actions have since become a metaphor for
feminist and subaltern resistance and the story has been picked up for many scholarly
analyses, the most famous of these provided by Gayatri Spivak.54 The wonderful Manipuri
actress Sabitri Devi performed a stunning dramatic version of this story in the form of
a play  staged in Manipur, captured powerfully in the film Lightning Testimonies by
Amar Kanwar on sexual violence in post-partition India. Dopdi has moved from being a
metaphor to a dramatic political figure expressing the anger, anguish and outrage of a
group of real women. That is what we have witnessed recently in Manipur, a place
occupying the margins of our consciousness—if at all it is in our consciousness.
In July 2004, the army picked up Manorama Devi from her home in Manipur, took
her away to an unknown destination, raped her and shot her dead55. Her body was
found in the fields the next day. Under the workings of the Armed Forces Special
Powers Act (AFSPA), in operation in the northeast since 1958, the army has complete
immunity from civil courts and has over the last fifty years functioned outside the ambit
of law. The discontent over army violations in the region exploded in Manipur after the
rape and killing of Manorama Devi. There were demonstrations and bandhs, yet most
of India characteristically took little note of what was happening in Manipur. Then one
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day a group of Manipuri women stripped themselves naked and demonstrated in front
of the headquarters of the army in Imphal daring the army to come and rape them:
they held banners that screamed: ‘Indian Army rape us’; ‘Indian Army come take our
flesh.’ Suddenly, and predictably, the media in India picked up the pictures and the
account of the demonstration from the local media; finally, the rest of India sat up and
took notice. All over Manipur, and other states of the Northeast, as well as in many
cities across India, civil rights groups demanded the unconditional withdrawal of the
AFSPA. Given the violence of the events triggered off by the incident, including the self
immolation by a protestor,56 some response by the state became imperative: first the
state in Manipur, and then at the centre, announced measures to placate the outraged
response from the people. Among the measures was a committee to review the AFSPA
and the Act was withdrawn in seven constituencies in Imphal, despite opposition from
the Centre. It remains in force in Manipur as in many other states and the findings of
the Commission set up to review the Act are yet to be made public.
The questions for some of us as civil rights activists and feminists is: why did it
take so long for army atrocities to be noticed by the media? Why did the earlier protests
after numerous rounds of atrocities die out? How informed were feminists in particular
of the repressive dimensions of the nation state as it has sought to stamp out the
demands for autonomy endemic to the region and manifested right from the time of
the end of colonial rule and the creation of the nation-state of India?  Why was it
necessary for a group of women to strip themselves and protest against the use of
rape to establish what domination means in a daily sense to people involved in a
movement for autonomy in the consciousnesses of women in other regions of the
country, for them to take note of what has been happening in the North East?57 And
even as all this was hitting the media, how many of us have become aware that there
is  by now an over six year-long fast unto death happening at this very moment by a
courageous woman, Irom Sharmila, who has been demanding the lifting of the AFSPA
since 2000, and that she was till recently being force-fed in a hospital, and that the
state controls and decides who can have access to her?58 Both Sharmila and the women
who protested the killing of Manorama, as well as the mothers of the ‘disappeared’ in
Jammu and Kashmir that I will discuss below, represent different ways such as shaming,
mourning and fasting, by which the abused female body is being used by women to
protest repressive state practices.
The women who stripped themselves in Manipur  in protest against the AFSPA’s
cover of immunity that would deny justice to the Manoramas of our country were
forcing the attention of the media by forcing attention upon themselves; they were
doing so because they were faced with an unbridgeable gap between the citizenry and
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the acts of the Indian army against which there was no redressal; they were not only
forcing the attention of the nation-state but also of democratic civil society and the
women’s movement in India. It is in this context that we need to ask: what does
feminism and nationalism mean to women in different parts of the nation-state of
India? Have we consciously addressed such questions to enable us to take positions
against the coercive apparatus of the state as part of the women’s movement as well
as in our scholarship? More than ever, since July 2004, these are questions that must
be confronted and I shall make a beginning for myself by looking at some moments in
the post-colonial history of India to see what the various strands of thinking and action
offer to us for an understanding of the manner in which the nation-state in India has
dealt with questions of sovereignty, autonomy, democracy, and the rule of law.
II.1 Mridula Sarabhai and the ethics of anti-nationalism
I will use the forgotten and marginalised persona of Mridula Sarabhai to begin to
articulate a possible politics that can emerge from an attempt to answer some of the
questions raised in this essay. Early on, I had a hazy picture of her, fed by popular
constructions of a well-intentioned but somewhat muddle-headed woman who espoused
the cause of the Kashmiri leader Sheikh Abdullah. Later, I became aware of her role in
the rescue of abducted women and their restoration to their ‘legal’ guardians during
and after the violence of the partition and my interest in her grew.59 But it is only now,
only in writing this paper, that I have become aware of the real import of Mridula
Sarabhai and the legacy she has left us. If only we grasp the meaning of her
uncompromising commitment to democracy, secularism, justice for all and a possible
nation based on these principles we would not opt for the form of a nation-state.60 Less
well-known than other women who participated in the nationalist movement, she alone
among them refused a position of power within the state and ultimately went to jail in
furtherance of her principles: independence for her was not merely the end of colonial
rule but more a set of values that would lend meaning to freedom as she understood
it, even if that meant that she was stigmatised as anti-national and unpatriotic.
A brief biography is necessary before we can focus on the issues that Mridula
Sarabhai became involved in: she was born in 1911, the eldest child of a wealthy and
illustrious business household in Ahmedabad, some of whose members had become
involved with the national movement through their association with Mahatma Gandhi.
Her aunt, Anusuya Sarabhai, had gone off to study in England partly to escape the
enforcement of conjugal rights arising from a conventional child marriage that would
tie her down; there, she became acquainted with the Fabian socialists and when she
finally returned to India, she was active in a strike of textile workers even as her
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brother, Mridula’s father, was positioned on the other side as a textile mill owner.61 The
strength to stand by locations opposed to even intimate others may have influenced
Mridula later in her life when she was virtually alienated because of her uncompromising
stand in support of Sheikh Abdullah and the Kashmiri people. She had known Gandhi
since she was a child of six, was deeply influenced by him, was drawn into the Congress
party in Gujarat, and ultimately became close to the socialist wing in the Congress, and
to Jawaharlal Nehru in particular. Her fiercely independent spirit and her uncompromising
integrity got her into ‘trouble’ repeatedly with the stalwarts of the Gujarat Congress,
on one occasion because she refused to accept the principle that the local unit of the
party must vote as a bloc as this was anti-democratic in her view.62
Mridula began to wear khadi as a girl of twelve and was once refused tea at a
restaurant in Shimla as part of a family visit when everyone else was acceptably dressed,
in accordance with the fashion of the day for Indian elites. She participated in the
boycott of liquor shops in the agitation against foreign goods, and then in the Dandi
march; her courageous actions thrilled the young and influenced other young women
to join satyagraha. But she was not a mindless follower of Gandhi and took issue with
his decisions which she suggested were not always democratic.63 According to one
observer, of all Gandhi’s women disciples, Mridula saw him with the clearest eyes and
would often say to him, ‘I am no Gandhian, remember!’64
It was the work not the person who held her allegiance; as she put it, she placed
honesty to herself above allegiance, whoever the person she was associated with
during her stormy political career. Mridula was also repeatedly jailed during the national
movement but used the occasions to leave a jail diary describing her experiences of
prison life. In one of the many entries that describe jail life, she wrote that she was put
in charge of keeping the toilets clean in the Sabarmati jail and so was nicknamed
General Officer Commanding of the Toilets! Prison also meant sleeping on the floor
with ten or twelve others so that if you turned at night, you touched another person’s
body. There was no privacy, day or night.  Despite her sheltered early upbringing and
the hardships of prison life, Mridula refused to be released on parole when her brother
was dying, even as everyone else in her family who was in prison for offering satyagraha
took it, because one had to give a bond and that was against her principles; instead,
she demanded her unconditional release which the colonial state denied her at that
point.65 The postcolonial state was to do the same to her later over the stand she took
on Kashmir, that is, put her in jail and make her release conditional upon good behaviour,
which, of course, she refused to accept.
Mridula’s inability to work within the confines of organisational imperatives because
of the compromises it entailed made her a lone worker, even though she had amazing
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organisational skills. She differed from the Congress leaders in Gujarat because of their
attitude towards gender, their communal biases, and the pragmatic way they handled
power.66 Her strengths as an organiser and dedicated worker ultimately were used in
what was termed as ‘peace’ work. In continuation of her work in the Ahmedabad riots
of 1941, she participated in the defusing of communal tensions in Noakhali and Bihar,
accompanying Gandhi during his stay there in 1947, helping in relief and rehabilitation
work. Earlier, she had faced Jat mobs in western and central Uttar Pradesh who were
trying to attack Muslims, going into the midst of the mob to persuade them to resist
from pursuing their attack. These experiences led directly to her life-long commitment
towards amity in Hindu-Muslim relations.
When Partition came, Mridula was drawn into the work of restoring abducted women
and children to their families which she threw herself into with characteristic zeal. This
work too led her to controversy, as always, but precisely because she had goodwill
among Hindus and Muslims, and was respected even in Pakistan, she managed to
continue right until 1953 when the Kashmir crisis took over her life in a way that she
and her political work came to be totally transformed; Mridula’s stand was a critical
component in the making of a public sphere in the context of the early postcolonial
nation state, ridden as it was with internal contradictions.
For most sections of the Indian middle class, Kashmir is a problem created by
Pakistan and its prioritising of Muslim religious identity as the sole basis of nationalism,
in contrast to India’s secular polity which is based on a pluralist national identity. What
gets erased in this construction is the long struggle for independence within Kashmir
from a feudal-monarchical rule of an oppressive social and political system. The people
of Kashmir had, since the 1920’s, long before the formal end of colonial rule, launched
a struggle for new social relations, land reform, the end of monarchy and the
establishment of the rule of the people. Towards this end, a movement was launched
in Kashmir, led by Sheikh Abdullah, against the rulers who were regarded as doubly
illegitimate as apart from being anti-democratic and oppressive towards the people,
they had ‘purchased’ Kashmir from the British, which was clearly not an acceptable
way of governing people. During this phase, leaders of the movement had prepared a
draft constitution for the future; they also launched a Quit Kashmir movement in 1946
against the ruler on the lines of the Quit India movement of the Congress against the
British in 1942. Sheikh Abdullah was arrested for these activities, so when independence
came in 1947, the Sheikh was in jail; the ruler procrastinated in signing the instrument
of accession either with India or Pakistan, unlike other rulers. He was trying to gain the
maximum leeway for his political agenda of retaining the substance of his rule and
negotiating both with Pakistan and India at the same time. For others in Kashmir, the
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dream of freedom meant a special status which was neither accession to India or to
Pakistan but azaadi within as well as a neutral status in relation to both nation-states,
akin to Switzerland caught between Germany and France.
Finally, circumstances created by the Pakistan-backed tribal invasion of the state
of J&K, led the ruler to sign the instrument of accession with India, but it was
accompanied by the promise on the part of India to ratify the accession through the
holding of a plebiscite, deferred to a time when the will of the people could be genuinely
ascertained. This moment has never come and over the years, the Indian government
has taken to regarding elections as a substitute for ascertaining the will of the people.
Elections themselves have had to be manipulated to keep a pliable government in
power and this has created a serious rift between the people of Kashmir and the
central government in Delhi.67
Sheikh Abdullah and his supporters made the argument that the accession by the
ruler itself was illegal as it is the people alone who can determine their constitutional
and political status, and the basis of such an agreement could not be some ‘illegal’ sale
deed between the British and a corrupt ruling dynasty of the past. This position was
supported by Jawaharlal Nehru and other members of the Congress party, including
Mridula, in the days before 1947. Jawaharlal Nehru was even prevented from entering
Kashmir to express solidarity with the Quit Kashmir movement against the ruler in
1946. However, Sheikh Abdullah’s position on the autonomy of Kashmir created a gradual
rift between the Kashmiri movement, which he led, and the Congress government in
New Delhi in the early 1950s. Finally, ill-advised by a coterie of hardliners, Jawaharlal
Nehru who had been a personal friend of Sheikh Abdullah’s, apart from a political
comrade, ordered the latter’s arrest in 1953 and thus it was that the Kashmir problem
came to stay;68 the arrest marked the  beginning of a series of anti-democratic moves
made by the centre against the Kashmiri people, the consequences of which we are
still bearing, albeit in dramatically new ways.
Mridula was in Amritsar, doing work with abducted women when Sheikh Abdullah’s
arrest was announced. She had been a focal point of the Friends of Kashmir group who
had tried to counter right-wing propaganda against the administrative and economic
measures taken by Sheikh Abdullah as Prime Minister of J&K, especially on the passing
of land reforms without compensation to the jagirdars who were mainly Hindus; the
tenants, on the other hand, were mainly Muslims, so the reforms were portrayed as a
communal action on the part of Sheikh Abdullah. Egged on by right-wing mobilisation,
the situation in Kashmir had deteriorated leading to the developments of faction-fighting
within the government of Kashmir, leading to the centre’s decision to arrest Sheikh
Abdullah. Nehru issued a statement in the Indian Parliament on August 10, 1953
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justifying the arrest as necessary in the ‘interest of peace’ which was threatened in
various ways69 and Mridula hit back by issuing a statement to the press on August 13,
at a time when no one else of importance seemed to want to protest. She was outraged
by the vitiated atmosphere in which rumours abounded and the condemnable role of
important political persons and the press in creating such a climate which paralleled
what had happened in Pakistan earlier in the case of the great Gandhian and freedom
fighter Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. She wrote:
Today one is reminded of the torrent of campaign that […] has been
started against that brave leader […] They tried to hide their power
politics on the ground of national security and dubbed him as an Indian
agent. Let us not degrade ourselves and follow such a path and swallow
all that is being said about Sheikh Abdullah […] I would plead with the
leaders, colleagues, the press and the people to rise to the occasion
and behave as decent opponents […] and if charges are to be levelled
let it be done in a court of justice and not behind the backs of those
who cannot defend themselves.70
The issuing of this statement in an atmosphere suffused with intrigue, betrayal, and
charges of acting against national security to support Sheikh Abdullah was to invite the
wrath of the general public, the new puppet government of J&K, and the Indian
government. Within hours, Mridula’s reputation was jeopardised and a campaign was
launched against her from within Congress circles. In the meanwhile, demonstrations
in Srinagar were put down ruthlessly. Sheikh Abdullah bemoaned the end of ‘Bapu’s
India’ with the Kashmiri people having to face bullets. In such a situation, he regarded
Mridula’s espousal of the Kashmiri cause as an act that recalled   Krishna’s support to
the Pandavas in the Mahabharata war.71 Later, he wrote to Mridula that he was pleased
that Bapu’s soul would be proud of what she was doing.
Regardless of the vicious campaign against her, Mridula continued to support the
cause of democracy and a philosophy of what she called ‘trust begets trust’.  She
smuggled petitions from those jailed in Kashmir and when she found that the hyper-
nationalist press refused to carry her statements, she took to writing ‘circulars’ which
were sent out widely and came to be an alternative way of reaching people. Her
position was quite straightforward: either Sheikh Abdullah should be charged and tried
or he should be released, as his imprisonment, based on a falsehood, violated the
Indian Constitution. She also argued against the existence of the Preventive Detention
Act which empowered the government to detain a person for five years without a
trial.72 India had already lost her prestige in acting as it did in the minds of the Kashmiri
25
people and so it was absolutely necessary, in her view, to restore the civil liberties of
the people of Kashmir forthwith.73
Never one to give up what she believed, Mridula continued to argue for the release
of the detained leadership, including the figure of Sheikh Abdullah. But Mridula herself
was now dubbed anti-national, partly because Pakistani leaders picked up on her
statements and used them to their advantage in international fora. In 1958, Mridula
was drawn into the Kashmir Conspiracy Case as a suspect, her house searched, and a
whisper campaign against her began with renewed vigour. Mridula wrote that the
weapon of the law was being used to ostracise her. Finally, when she was detained, the
government claimed that this was done in order to prevent her from indulging in
further anti-Kashmir propaganda! The charges against her, meriting arrest, included
support for Sheikh Abdullah and his followers, the claim that she herself was in regular
touch with people hostile to the security of India, and that these activities were calculated
to prejudice the relations of India with foreign powers, and thus threatened the security
of India. Mridula appealed against her detention to various authorities, including the
Supreme Court, but to no avail: no one would listen to someone who was stigmatised
as anti-national and, in any case, it was widely believed that national security demanded
her incarceration in the best interests of the nation.
A year after being held without trial, her old teacher and the doyen of the old
Congress socialists, then leader of the Praja Socialist Party, Acharya Kripalani,
characterised her detention in Parliament as an undemocratic and unconstitutional act.
This was India not Russia, he said, and added:
I cannot understand a former General Secretary of the Congress being
held under the Preventive Detention Act. Do we hold, like the
totalitarians, our best men[sic] under suspicion? Has Miss Mridula done
something treasonable? She would not betray the country. Let her be
tried. Let there be a fair trial, otherwise there will always be an
impression in the minds of people that she was engaged in treasonable
activities against the Government.74
The worst blow came from Nehru who dismissed the ‘bundles of paper’ sent by her as
proof of her being a bit touched in the head. Whatever her earlier history may have
been in the service of the nation, she was now cast, retrospectively, as someone
whose judgement had always been suspect75 and, at this point, she was harming the
country, though the great leader was kind enough to exonerate her of the charge of
treason. Nehru cast himself as something of a tragic hero who was forced to act
26
against dear friends in the cause of the nation, despite the pain it caused him. Then he
quoted some lines ‘that came to his head’ from Shakespeare:
And to be wrath with those we love,
Doth work like madness in the brain.76
It seems that the madness was working on Mridula’s brain; her actions were so anti-
national and harmful to India that she had to be put away where she could no longer
cause damage to the nation.
Having read the text of the debate in Parliament that so vilified her, Mridula
responded with a petition from jail to the Lok Sabha. She took no offence at the
suggestion that she continued to be an ‘immature girl’ (she was 47) as that was the
way the old often treated those who were younger than them. But she asked with
persistence:
If the authorities were so sure of their stand that I had been spreading
lies, why did they not take the opportunity to detain me under the
Preventive Detention Act and get a thorough investigation made into
the cases which have been dubbed as lies?
[…] On personal considerations one should have given up working for
the people of Kashmir. But to me the service of the nation has a larger
meaning […] and in that process one has to be prepared to get
annihilated completely […] That is the lesson I learnt at the feet of
Bapu and Nehru. In the context of Kashmir, it is the national and
emotional integration which can be achieved by the co-operation of
the people on the basis of trust begets trust.77
Mridula got no reply from the august parliament to this petition. Her own engagement
with the Congress party for thirty years had ended when the Gujarat Congress took
disciplinary action against her for her anti-national activities as a journalist on the
ground that her circulars on Kashmir were treasonable. Mridula’s attempt at explaining
her actions as part of the peace and communal amity work which she had been doing
since 1946 made no impact on the Congress leadership.78 No one understood or respected
her position on the postcolonial nation state as a system that was to be made capable
of internal dialogue, dissent and a re-imagining of territorial arrangements inherited
from its specific colonial past; thus, the moment for exploring an alternative set of
possibilities and practices was irretrievably lost by the first generation of the post-
independence political class.
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Mridula spent some eight months of her prison term of almost two years in solitary
confinement, and wrote that she found little difference between imprisonment by the
British and the nationalist governments. When her father fell seriously ill, the government
offered to release her on parole. Once again, she declined on principle as she refused
to give the required undertaking that she would do nothing unlawful, saying she had
done nothing unlawful anyway, and her detention was, in any case, illegal.
When she was finally released unconditionally, she continued with her support for
her Kashmiri friends and went on to organise the defence for those imprisoned in the
Kashmir Conspiracy Case. This was followed by one more round of custody when she
was interned in Ahmedabad in 1965 under the Defence of India Rules. She was then
adopted by Amnesty International as a ‘prisoner of conscience’ for her non-violent
espousal of the cause of human rights. Her lobbying for the unconditional release of
Sheikh Abdullah and a peaceful, negotiated resolution finally found some takers in
Parliament and outside it with Jayaprakash Narayan, among others, taking over the
campaign and mediating in a discussion with Sheikh Abdullah.79
When she died in 1974, the Kashmir problem was far from resolved. On hindsight,
we can see that if there had been more Mridulas, less obsession with territory and
borders, and more concern with integrating peoples together, Kashmir may never have
moved into the phase of violence still being played out today. From Mridula’s point of
view, she had been trying to extend Bapu’s experiment to find out “an instrument for
individuals and natives of free countries to resist internal forces of disruption of
democracy” in her support for Kashmir.80 It was this stance that led to the establishment
declaring her mad, to be put into an asylum. Resistance to a blind nationalism and the
demands of loyalty from its citizens by a nation-state in South Asia in the postcolonial
period was indeed a madness if it was the position of a single individual, and that too
a woman. That is a chastening thought but also a chilling reminder of the power of
nation-state ideology, of the fragile nature of nationalisms of South Asia.
When I look back on the last years of Mridula’s life, I am struck by the fact that I
was already then a teacher, and had close friends among the socialist network who
espoused the cause that she had been fighting for; some of these socialists had even
taken on the Kashmir issue in a mediating capacity and yet there was little public
recognition of Mridula’s long struggle in support of Kashmir in the media, or even in
ordinary conversation that was happening around me. Both Gandhi (symbolically) and
Nehru whom she cited as her mentors, still dominated the public sphere in the 60’s and
70’s and yet no one talked of Mridula. All I can recall is a hazy connection of her name
being associated with some kind of a ‘bee in her bonnet’ about Kashmir.
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Why was it so easy to erase the dissenting voice of Mridula from the public sphere?
Nationalism and patriotism, strong sentiments in the post- Independence phase were
intensified  after the India-China war, the Indo-Pak war of 1965, and finally the liberation
of Bangladesh (with Mrs. Gandhi being portrayed as a Durga who won the war against
evil) and these sentiments dominated the attention of the media and mainstream
political discourse in the sixties and seventies. Even those of us, like me, who gravitated
in the direction of opposition to the state did not really have a strong sense of the
internal contradictions of the nation-state from the point of view of territorial
arrangements. Almost certainly this was because it was the class question that dominated
and determined the nature of political opposition to the state in the 1970’s and so, for
us, Mridula left no direct legacy that linked up to the concerns of the day. This was true
even for those of us who had recognised that the postcolonial nation state had failed,
or at least failed to respond to the aspirations of the mass of the Indian people. The
slogan of the day, ‘Yeh azaadi jhoothi hai’ 81 (this freedom is false), though pegged on
economic questions, could have included the political aspirations of the ‘regions’, since
it harked back to the anti-colonial struggle and the movement for independence which
had led to the birth of the nation-state of India in 1947; yet the question of governance
and autonomy did not resonate with the meanings they acquired in the 80’s and
thereafter, forcing the Indian middle class and the intelligentsia in particular to take
note of them.
II.2 Fact-Finding and the Critique of the Nation-state
Critical issues and events in the late sixties and seventies unfolded, first in the form of
the emergence of peasant and adivasi movements in the late sixties—a consequence
of the unsatisfied hunger for land among the rural masses—which interrogated the
elite nature of the state, and, later, the clamping of Emergency in 1975, in response to
political unrest in a variety of forms. Both were manifestations of the crisis of the post-
independence nation-state in India and were challenges to the middle class since the
repression to which the Indian state resorted during this phase was unprecedented.
The university was the field of action for students and teachers, some of whom were
rounded up, and this shook us to the core.
Ultimately, when Emergency was lifted, state repression against peasant activists
and political opponents of the regime in power were central to the emergence of the
civil rights movement, and later the women’s movement, in both of which many of us
got involved. These developments led to wider links being established between activists
working in these different fora and fed directly into a loose coalition of democratic
resistance groups that have allowed for the re-thinking and conceptualising, for the
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first time, the social and political bases of the nation-state in India and its repressive
dimensions in maintaining unity at any cost. A series of such links meant that that the
nationality question had to be addressed as a distinct feature of understanding the
basis of the nation-state and its repressive and anti-democratic manifestations in the
North-east and in J&K. Again, like Mridula Sarabhai, it is through Nandita Haksar
(originally a student of mine who soon became, and continues to be a well known
Human Rights activist and lawyer) as an individual woman who became involved with
the Naga People’s Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR) that I personally became
‘conscious’ of what was happening in the North-East.  Nandita has occupied many
cross cutting locations: a feminist with a left background, a civil rights activist and a
staunch opponent of communalism. When the repression against the Nagas of Manipur
reached alarming proportions, the NPMHR began to approach civil rights activists; the
university  was a site for many dialogues not only on repression but also on the nationality
movements active in the North-East.82  Through such interactions a women’s fact finding
team was constituted to go to the villages of Manipur following a massive round of
army atrocities in Ukhrul in 1982. The difficulties between an individual engagement
with an issue and a collective feminist/women’s position on repression by the state in
a region, by then well-sedimented as anti-national in the minds of what is called ‘mainland
India,’ the North-East, surfaced in a way that has shaped, to an extent, feminist
engagements with nationalism in India.
The group that constituted the fact-finding-team were drawn from senior and
respected women in left/secular parties and civil rights groups. Perhaps the first of
such civil society groups to go to the North-East, the team met a large number of
people who had experienced army atrocities as well as officials in the civil administration
and army officers stationed in the region. The report was extremely well-documented,
graphically portraying the atrocities against the people especially against women, and
the sense of terror experienced by them under the rule of the army, which was well
protected by the clauses of the AFSPA.
Both rape and sodomy were reported, apart from other atrocities83. Yet, when it
came to finalising the report and making it public two of the team members declined to
sign the report as they could not bring themselves to sign a document that would indict
the army.84 The report was published without their names but these debates on the
army and its use in the name of national security were not debated in public by women’s
groups so the issues it generated never moved forward in thinking about the relationship
between feminism and nationalism in a post-colonial context.
The nationality question in the North-East and movements for autonomy however
continued to be manifested in a variety of ways and came to be analysed in numerous
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writings, especially after the Assam movement raised questions about insiders and
outsiders in the region, and sought to delimit citizenship in an ethnically complicated
region. At the same time questions of violence against women, and especially rape by
the security forces in the wider context of patriarchies—both internal to local communities
and in more specifically militarised ways by the state— has been analysed in the writing
of a feminist scholar from Assam, Aparna Mahanta who has had a long engagement
with democratic movements in the North-East. She has suggested that rape has been
conceptualised at a political level by movements for autonomy in the region as distinct
from its connotations with shame in other regions where the perpetrators are not also
seen as the political enemy:
[In the context of such conflicts] rape is the most common allegation
that is made, or at least is the one that draws the most media
attention…The delegation of rape to the personal, as a matter of
individual or family honour, by the Indian legal system has been
contested by the women’s movement. More specifically, in the NE since
the 1960s in the context of military operations where the rapists were
themselves the instruments of the Indian State, rape has been treated
as a ‘public’ political issue.85
This works both constructively and otherwise; while democratic movements may use it
to seek accountability from the state, as in the case of Ukhrul and later Oinam, when
the NPMHR took the matter to court as part of a larger human rights issue, political
parties used it to emphasise women’s vulnerability and push them back from the political
sphere. Aparna herself has stressed the need to find local examples of mobilisation
and support for women assaulted by the armed forces which does not deny agency,
including political agency, to them. 86
Linking the movements for autonomy in the North-East with the movement for
azaadi in Kashmir in terms of continuing engagement, have been ‘normal’ for civil
rights and other democratic-left groups, as well as the few feminist groups that did
respond to state repression in the context of the nationality question. From the early
1990s, Jammu and Kashmir returned to the attention of the political world following
the rise of a militant movement for azaadi or freedom.  Civil society groups and
democratic rights activists however responded, almost immediately after the popularly
supported movement for azaadi began, following, once more, an outrageously
manipulated election. They initiated a series of reports on human rights violations to
document attempts by the state to crush the demand for azaadi, backed by militancy.
Almost immediately, the first all women’s fact finding team went to Kashmir; it included
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Nandita Haksar who already had considerable experience in documenting violations
and thinking about democratic movements, the autonomy question and the operations
of a militarised state in the North- East.
The first women’s team spent a week in the valley in June 1990 and produced a
solid report on conditions in the valley since the phase of militancy and the state’s
response to it began; it was set firmly within a framework of what militarisation meant
to people living between ‘two sets of guns’.87 Its terms of reference were to ‘investigate
the impact of the militarisation of the Kashmir Valley on the lives of the people there,
especially the women’. Militarisation was a new phenomenon in the valley, even though
the presence of the army was normal since it was a border region, and there had been
three wars between India and Pakistan.  What was unique to ‘militarisation’ as
understood in this report was its takeover of civil society and the subordination of the
civil administration to the security forces; this too without any formal transfer of powers
or the invocation of special powers.  This was before the Armed Forces Special Powers
Act was formally applied in Jammu and Kashmir.
The report went on to examine the ‘law and order’ justification given by the
government for the new militarised situation, refuting it on the ground that the terror
let loose by the security forces was damaging the very secular foundation of India;
action by them was no longer directed at the militants but instead the security forces
were treating the entire Kashmiri people as enemies.88
While the report did examine the consequences of the militarisation of civil society
through the acts of the militants, and their statistical breakdown of deaths included
killings by militants, the focus of the report was on the militarised state and its chapter
heads bear this out.89 The chapter which specifically focussed on women’s experiences
of militarisation is framed in terms of a feminist understanding of women caught between
two kinds of coercive structures, and tackles fundamentalism head on before it moves
to examining the militarised state:
Women in the valley have no channel for expressing their anger at
fundamentalism. They have been forced into silence. One woman [who]
wrote in a local paper was threatened…Yet the Kashmiri Woman has
made her opinion known;…writing under assumed names they have
told the militants that they support the struggle for freedom but not
the oppression of women.90
Kashmiri women were not only faced by fundamentalism and the imposition of the
burqa, against which they protested, but were also now the target of military violence;
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of brute force on a large scale which included rape and sexual assault by the security
forces, in front of fathers and brothers. Four cases were documented in detail after
visits to the scene of the violations. Then, following the detailing of the gruesome
experiences, the report ends with the plea for a return to constitutional norms. In stark
contrast to a section of the press baying for stringent measures, including the use of
government propaganda and greater powers to the security forces, the women’s team
concluded with these words:
We vehemently disagree with such a sinister solution to the problem.
[Our cases show] that the use of security forces for internal security
has not only antagonised the people of Kashmir from the armed forces
but also from the rest of the country. It is a politically bankrupt approach
which resorts to military solutions to political problems.
In the name of unity and integrity of India, Indians cannot be deprived
of their inalienable fundamental rights…A political emergency is no
ground for lawless action. It is in fact time to assert the spirit of the
Indian Constitution and protect the human rights of people.91
What is notable in the tone of this report is its positioning against militarisation, its
commitment to democracy, its belief that secularism is on trial in Kashmir; the negation
of the constitutional rights through violations taking place in Kashmir is seen as ‘against
the people of India,’ of which Kashmir is still considered a part. The question of autonomy
and self-determination was for the moment skirted in a formulation that positioned
itself against atrocities from a civil and human rights perspective, albeit with a feminist
understanding of an oppressive state’s violence towards women.92
Even before the Report was completed, the AFSPA was promulgated in Jammu
and Kashmir. Soon after, the state was placed under President’s rule and so the elected
government of Jammu and Kashmir ceased to function. Atrocities by the security forces
continued unabated and human rights violations were simultaneously  documented.
With no internal checks and  new impunity available to the security forces, violence
against women intensified. In 1991 a remote village witnessed an all-night terror raid
on women, where some 30 women in the village were raped. Kunan Poshpora has
come to symbolise sexual violence against Kashmiri women and caught the attention
of the national and the international media. A two-member women’s team including
Amiya Rao, a senior and well respected civil rights activist whose personal activism
started long before independence, visited Kashmir and demanded an enquiry into the
rapes at Kunan Poshpora.93 The Press Council of India sent an enquiry team, headed
by a respected male journalist, B.G. Verghese, who had a good civil rights supporting
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record. Alas, when the report was made public, he exonerated the army, arguing that
the allegations were fabricated and motivated in order to ‘defame’ the army. The
nation, and the army became synonymous; the version of the army was the version of
the press and the sexual violence against women counted for little.94
In 1994, as violence continued even under the watchful gaze of President’s rule
another women’s team went to the valley of Kashmir. This team was admittedly a
‘women’s initiative’ and its central focus was the experiences of women caught between
what they called the ‘gun and the burqa’. Moving and poignant accounts of how women
cope with violence, the many facets of their location as both victims and resisters, fill
the testimonies in the report.  The report also carried some stunning and evocative
visuals by the feminist artist/photographer Sheba Chhacchi who has documented the
women’s movement in all its richness and complexity. Significantly, the team members
took the view that as women, who share a common history as feminists and active
members of the women’s movement, their deepest concern was for an end to the
violence in Kashmir. They sought to reach out across barriers created by nations, states,
culture and ideology. But perhaps because feminists have been strong advocates for
regaining control over their own lives, they also said that the team shared an agreement
on the principle of self-determination and that the Kashmiri people must decide their
own future95.
The team spoke to a large number of women, men and children. The report
documented the trauma, of the way women coped and tried to find ways of healing
their psychological wounds; how farewell greetings had changed from ‘Khuda Hafiz’ or
‘God be with you’ to ‘sahi salamat laut aana,’ or ‘Come back safe’, as violence had taken
over everyday life; as in hospitals doctors noted the increase in spontaneous abortions;
as cases of mental stress increased manifold times according to the staff of a government
psychiatric hospital; the tragedy of the disappeared and of the families who did not
know whether their loved ones were alive or dead as well as the peculiar phenomenon
of the half-widows that enforced disappearances had generated. Women’s active support
for militancy was documented as was the investment by some women in a radical,
Islamic, pro-Pakistani militancy to oppose the ‘Indian state’. Significantly it tried to
attempt to understand not only the militant but also the ‘jawans’ the ordinary soldiers
of the paramilitary and military forces regarded as the killers but who too were being
killed, surrounded as they were by the hatred of those who they were allegedly
protecting. These jawans were the sons of peasants and artisans whose earnings
supported their families; now they were being brutalised and dehumanised, becoming
killers without conscience, pawns in the hands of state power: but they too wanted
peace and many of them left offerings at shrines for blessings 96.
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The team visited three villages where rapes had been reported and obtained first-hand
accounts, one of these was Kunan Poshpora, the village which the Press Club team had
certified as housing liars.  Subjected to severe media attention, the women who have
been raped were being stigmatised and taunted for what happened to them even by
the men of their own village.  Only Asiya Andrabi, of the radical Islamic women’s group
called the Dukhtaran-e-Millat could see the acts of the forces as serving a purpose. She
said: ‘We thank the forces for their excesses. The more atrocities they commit the
more people will be willing to take to arms for the struggle’. The team members of the
Women’s Initiative in 1994, as women who heard these testimonies, exhorted other
women in ‘India’, who would hopefully read what they had written, with the words: ‘As
sisters, neighbours, what we have heard and witnessed cannot rest lightly on our
conscience. We call upon all concerned parties: stop this killing’ 97.
Killings have unfortunately continued through various regimes up until the moment
of writing this essay: President’s rule was followed by elections, mostly rigged and,
occasionally, relatively free, through ceasefires and undeclared wars, even through
what is called peace talks but are in reality only a time for hard bargaining between
men occupying different locations of power. There are many local initiatives at ‘peace-
work’; more fact finding and more reports, but even so there has been no defusing of
the violence in Kashmir. When I visited Kashmir, for the first time in my life in 2002 - as
part of another of those fact finding teams - the reality of living in Kashmir was brought
home to us so many different ways: a girl who wanted desperately to be a doctor but
could not be because of the ‘abnormality of the times’ said that things would become
normal only when ‘we’, meaning women like us, made that happen; team members
who reached inaccessible areas and were provided information found later that their
informants faced ‘reprisal’ rape 98; and two of us had to take cover in a college that we
had visited when the school with a visiting politician next door was hit by a sniper
bomb attack.99  That was part of everyday life in Kashmir.
The difficulties between an individual engagement with an issue and a collective
feminist/women’s position on repression by the state in regions by then well-sedimented
as anti-national in the minds of ‘mainland India,’ that is the North-East and Jammu &
Kashmir, surfaced in a way that has shaped, to an extent, feminist engagements with
nationalism. Suffering and trauma have been documented in fact-finding reports by
civil rights and women’s rights groups from the early 90s and more recently in studies
sponsored by NGOs involved in peace initiatives. Women whose family members have
gone missing in enforced disappearances have come to Delhi to speak, and weep,
before ‘sympathetic’ people to mobilise women and men to demand state accountability
and an end to the impunity granted to the security forces through the cover provided
35
by the AFSPA. As the testifiers put it, despite going to the courts repeatedly to seek an
answer from the state authorities about the whereabouts of their missing relatives,
they get no relief from the courts, only fresh dates for the court to hear the cases and
an endless round of postponements. The women have refused compensation offered
by the state for the missing relatives because that grants de facto immunity to the
security forces (as one of them put it: “did the sky eat them up or the earth take them
in?”) and this they will not give to the state because theirs is a struggle for accountability,
not for money. Theirs is a long, almost hopeless, non-violent struggle for justice which
few people, including the media, are willing to take note of because it does not make
for ‘attractive’ sound bytes.100
By Way of a Summing Up
I began this essay calling for an examination of the relationship between feminism and
nationalism as a point from which to look at South Asian feminist scholarship on it that
we could all learn from. Although this piece that I have written is really an overview,
rather than an in-depth analysis of the way women have looked at postcolonial
nationalism that have informed our understanding of the nation-state, it has been a
journey of realisation for me. I began with a sense of concern that feminist scholarship
had not really engaged with the practices of the nation-state nor subjected it enough
to feminist scrutiny. I can see now that there have been many moves on our part to
resist the mechanical investment in the ideology of nationalism which dominant
discourses have demanded of us. It is true that the postcolonial nation-state was
premised on the linking of capitalism, the bourgeoisie, and anti-colonial nationalism,
with which the women’s movement of the pre-independence period was also suffused.
As Kumari Jayawardena’s work shows, such factors set the parameters by way of the
expanses and the limits of women’s consciousnesses, and made for their emotional
investment in both class and nation as specific types of postcolonial creation. But I can
also now see that there have been journeys that many South Asian feminists have
made, propelled by the historical circumstances in their respective countries, especially
in the last few decades, that has forced them to interrogate their own nation-states
and the idea of nationalism.
In Part One of this essay, I looked at the interventions and the scholarship in
Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, and in Part Two, I examined the feminist
engagement in terms of political ‘practice’ with nationalism and the nation-state in
India, which is yet to generate theoretical ‘scholarship’ on the subject though the
Women’s Reports have taken the lead in ‘theorising’ the issues outlined in this essay,
by strongly critiquing state practices. This production of knowledge is yet to receive its
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due in postcolonial scholarship, feminist or mainstream/malestream, obsessed as it is
as of now with colonial state practices.
In summing up, I want to analyse the strengths and the limits of this engagement
and the feminist scholarship generated in recent years around the themes of nationalism
and the practices of the nation-state, keeping in mind the ethical horizon I set up
through the figure of Mridula Sarabhai in Part Two.
Indian feminists have been critical of the class character of nationalism in the
colonial period101 and of the postcolonial Indian state for its repressive actions against
the people’s movement for land, wages, environment, sharing with men their concerns
on these issues. They have also focussed considerable attention on the violence of the
state towards marginalised women, especially when enacted by state functionaries in
terms of the continuing use of sexual violence by the police and security forces to
humiliate and abuse women and the communities to which they belong. Some of the
finest work has come in exploring sexual violence during Partition, breaking the silence
around the issue, and thus gendering Partition Studies which was virtually a non-
existent field till the feminists opened it up with their work.
This work amounted to a very important critique of the nation- state, at the very
moment of its birth in India and Pakistan, showing up its deeply patriarchal and
paternalist character in establishing control over abducted women and forcibly aligning
women with the boundaries of the new nations, based on the religious identity of the
woman. This gave women no choice in the decision of where they would like to be
located, given that the very same states had failed to protect them against the sexual
violence in the first instance.102 Unfortunately, this early lead has not been followed up
by examining the nation-state in the sixty years since then, in India at any rate. What
has been slow in developing is a feminist understanding of nationalism, the militarisation
of civil society in areas of internal conflict, and of the autonomy question which has
been the ground from which such conflicts have sprung.
Some Indian feminists are responding with anger or anguish at the perceived
‘failure’ of the women’s movement in taking a more forthright position against state
repression and in thinking about the internal organisation of the nation-state, the
failure of democracy, the forcible submission of diversity to the principle of unity in
nation-state practices in the much-publicised unity-in- diversity formula ostensibly to
be the unique contribution of India to nationalism in South Asia. We have sought to
rethink sovereignty and citizenship from a feminist perspective, that is to re-conceptualise
the nation- state itself.103
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As feminists, we have reached a critical moment in India in going beyond the very fine
critiques of right-wing Hindu nationalism, communalism and the gendered violence it
has spawned, to engage with other questions around the nation state.104 The feminist
focus on the right-wing Hindu nationalists’ capture of state power in the 1990s has
brought a critical edge to our new concerns. The issue of India going nuclear in 1998,
within a few months of the Hindu nationalist, right-wing-led coalition coming to power,
soon telescoped into wider global developments with 9/11 and wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq, making us think about militarisation with a new urgency.105
Women’s groups put out a statement on the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
which articulated a feminist critique of war.106 Late in 2001, the terrorist attack on the
Indian Parliament on 13 December nearly led to war between India and Pakistan and
a terrifying media campaign against those arrested by the police which included a
teacher of Delhi University who had been a colleague and comrade of many of us in
democratic initiatives in the university. Also charged in the conspiracy to attack the
Indian Parliament was the wife of another accused whom the special trial court judge
sentenced for eight years for allegedly putting her loyalty to her husband above her
loyalty to the nation and thus betraying the nation.107 The jingoistic nationalism we
witnessed at this stage and the frightening hatred unleashed against the accused by
the media and a totally communalised civil society including the University, hatred too
for those who supported some of the accused and demanded fair trial, the suspension
of civil rights under black laws passed in the wake of the incident, the painful alienation
of the families of the accused, all these were a reminder of the power of nationalism
and its instrumental use by those controlling the state in our regions.108 The media’s
handling of the case has been the context for a very decisive feminist formulation of
the need to look at the demand for autonomy/independence in Jammu & Kashmir and
the North-East and the repressive actions of the Indian state, supported in the main by
those who dominate the Indian public sphere, from a core element of feminist thinking:
Let us look at the long and bitter conflict [in Kashmir] from a feminist
perspective. Does it not occur to you that forced unions between
peoples or nations are very similar to forced unions between men and
women? A marriage between a man and a woman, imposed by a
patriarchal structure against the wishes of the woman, (or the man)
results in the family being based on resentment, bitterness and hatred.
So does a union between two peoples forced by a state….109
The rape of Manorama Devi by security forces and the demonstration by Manipuri
women who stripped themselves to challenge the power of the state, as well as the
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quiet, unknown and more than six year-long fast unto death by Irom Sharmila against
the AFSPA, that still continues, have all shaken the women’s movement in India. This
is the moment for us to go beyond our segmented engagement with regions such as
the North-East where we extol the actions of women who protest against the patriarchal
violence of the family, and community, but hesitate to condemn the patriarchal violence
of the state with the same enthusiasm. The Manorama incident has created a new
urgency and sparked off a long overdue initiative with Saheli, a women’s group in
Delhi, first making a formal submission to the Committee to review the AFSPA and then
taking the lead in mobilising a joint statement against the AFSPA110; they have also
supported Irom Sharmila in her struggle to lift the AFSPA and demonstrations by Manipuri
women against the AFSPA in Delhi on the eve of Republic Day in 2008 and more
recently with Burmese women refugees.  The Indian Association of Women’s Studies
conference in 2005 passed a resolution against the AFSPA and demanded its lifting; it
also passed another resolution against the increasing levels of militarisation and state
repression against movements in various parts of the country.111 Perhaps we stand at a
new threshold in shaking off the ‘burdens’ of nationalism from a feminist perspective,
a process during which we must remember the indomitable anti-nationalist commitment
to the difficulties of standing by one’s truth and speaking in one’s voice beyond not just
the stifling, insecure nation-state form, but the limits of endurance, embodied in the
forgotten voice of Mridula Sarabhai.
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